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Stepping Up the War on Drugs:
Prosecution and Enhanced Sentences
for Conspiracies to Possess or
Distribute Drugs Under State and
Federal Schoolyard Statutes
Drug abuse cuts -across all cultural, racial, and economic lines
and impairs millions of Americans. Drug use is inextricably
linked to crime and violence, and contributes to the breakdown
of our families, the abuse of children and adults, the spread of
the AIDS virus, school dropouts and the declining quality of
education, homelessness, urban decay, high healthcare costs,
and economic productivity and competitiveness. We must
reduce the number of people who use drugs to significantly
improve the most pressing domestic issues we face. Preventing
drug use by young people, and all who influence them, must be
the cornerstone of national, state and local drug strategies and
resources if we are to build safe and healthy families and
communities.'
I. Introduction
It is difficult to imagine any problem more prevalent in the
United States than the problem of illicit drug usage and addiction,
especially use and addiction among our nation's youth.2 During
the late 1970s and the early 1980s, drug usage by Americans
1. Prepared Testimony by Thomas A. Hedrick, Jr. Vice Chairman, Partnership for a
Drug-Free America Before the Government Reform and Oversight Committee Subcommittee
on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, Fed. News Serv., Mar. 9,
1995, available in LEXIS Nexis Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Hedrick].
2. Id. "What we must face today is the crisis of dramatically increasing drug use
among our youth." Id. In fact, the problem has become so prevalent that some educators
are calling for drug education programs to begin as early as at the Kindergarten level.
Maureen Gilmer, Kindergarten Drug Program is Proposed, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Apr. 25,
1995, at B03. See also, News: PRIDE Hopes Drug Lessons Learned to Turn Off Teen Use
(CNN News broadcast, Nov. 2, 1995) (transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURNWS File)[hereinafter PRIDE].
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reached an all-time high.3 In response, the Reagan administration
announced plans4 to escalate its attacks in the infamous war on
drugs.' Under the aegis of the drug war banner, the federal and
state governments fortified their drug laws and increased their
expenditures to combat the increasing drug problem.
Among the laws enacted to protect society from an increasing
dependence on drugs were the so called "Schoolyard Statutes."7
These provisions were passed by the federal and state legislatures
in order "to halt the proliferation of drug use among school-age
children and to shield children from the direct and indirect effects
of drug trading, including observing drug sales."8  The typical
schoolyard statute either constitutes a distinct criminal offense9 or
imposes increased penalties for the commission of specified drug or
weapons offenses ° when the offense occurs within a set range of
school property." However, the effectiveness of these provi-
3. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
4. Diane-Michele Krasnow, To Stop the Scourge: The Supreme Court's Approach to the
War on Drugs, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 219, 220 (1992). "The mood toward drugs is changing in
this country, and the momentum is with us .., Drugs are bad and we're going after them.
... [W]e've taken down the surrender flag and run up the battle flag. And we're going to
win the war on drugs." Id. (quoting a 1982 radio address by President Ronald Reagan).
5. Id. The war against drugs is properly labeled infamous since most Americans fail
to understand the temporal and fiscal extent of the war. See id.
6. Charles Rangel, Our National Drug Policy, 1 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 43,46 (1989).
"As evidenced by the enactment of the omnibus anti-drug bills of 1986 and 1988, Congress
focused its attention on a massive injection of federal resources to fight the war against
drugs." Il
7. Numerous types of "Schoolyard Statutes" have been passed by the different
jurisdictions. This comment will select and focus on several particular statutes. See 21
U.S.C. § 860(a) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-432
(1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D (1992).
8. Velez v. State, 664 A.2d 387,394 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995). Furthermore, the court
stated that "the purpose of the legislature was to shield school children from the potential
interference with their education from exposure to drugs that could arise from being in close
proximity to the criminal drug milieu." Id. at 395.
9. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D.
10. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-432.
11. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). Typically, these statutes are quite specific in setting the
range of distance to which the provision is to be applied, commonly set to 1,000 feet. Id.
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sions,12 and the war on drugs in general, 3 has increasingly been
questioned during the past five years. 4
The marked increase in drug use among youths in the past
three years 5 requires increased action in order to attain the goals
of this war on drugs.t6 A Maryland Appellate Court has taken
one possible route using a weapon that is already in place. 7 In
reaching its decision, the Maryland court upheld the application of
a schoolyard statute in the prosecution of a criminal defendant who
never possessed, nor ever intended to possess, drugs within the
statutory zone. 8 Instead, the defendant was convicted for the
commission of acts within the statutory zone which were in
furtherance of a general conspiracy to deliver drugs at a different
location beyond the proscribed zone. 9 Using the rationale
underlying the Maryland Court's decision as a guidepost, other
jurisdictions should expand the application of their schoolyard
statutes in the hopes of changing the tide of battle in the war
against drugs.
This comment argues that the rationale from the decision in
Velez v. State should be applied with near uniformity among all the
12. Marcus Montoya, Drug-free Program Nabs Few: Cops Tout Other Benefits of Zones,
COL SPRINGS GAZETrE TELEGRAPH, Dec. 28, 1993, at Al.
13. Doug Bandow, War on Drugs or War on America, 3 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 242,
244-45 (1991).
14. Id. See also, Small-timers Get Hard Time; Some Major Dealers Evade Stiff Sentences
Others Can't Escape, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1995, at Metro/Region I [hereinafter Small-
timers].
This comment focuses on the ways in which the existing Schoolyard provisions can be
used to effectuate an change in the availability and desirability of drugs in general. Some
commentators have taken a drastic stand at the polar opposite to the drug war approach.
See Bandow, supra note 13. These commentators express the opinion that the drug war has
caused severe problems for society and has been, in general, ineffective. Id. Except for a
brief introduction, the study of such positions is beyond the scope of this comment. See infra
Part IV.
15. See, e.g., Rachel Ehrenfeld, Retreating from the War on Drugs, WASH. TIMEs, Feb.
28, 1995, at A21. There is an never-ending source of articles which describe the increase of
teenage drug use in the last several years. See also, Debra Gordon, Tackling the Issue of
Drugs; Parents, Teens Contemplate the Startling Statistics, Share their Ideas, VIRGINIA-PILOT,
Sept. 16, 1995, at B1; Robert Dole, Why Teen Drug Use is Rising, WASH. TIMES, Sept 22,
1995, at A21; Kids Aren't Just Saying No, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 18, 1995, at B6;
Teen-agers' Marijuana Use Soaring; Report Finds Adult Drug Use Leveling Off, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 13, 1995, at 1A [hereinafter Teen-agers'].
16. See Dole, supra note 15.
17. Velez v. State, 664 A.2d 387 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 39.
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jurisdictions possessing and utilizing a schoolyard provision,
regardless of the differences in the original design and prior
application of these statutes. Part II identifies the historical and
factual backdrop against which the need for the suggested reforms
should be examined. Part III briefly discusses the Velez decision.
Part IV examines some suggested alternatives to an extension of
the drug war as advocated in Velez and describes some basic
problems with these alternatives as solutions to the American drug
problem. Part V identifies the two basic types of schoolyard
statues currently enacted in the United States and discusses the
basic characteristics of each. Part VI consists of an analysis of the
possible application of the Velez rationale in several selected
jurisdictions currently utilizing the two major types of schoolyard
statutes. Part VII considers some of the concerns with the
proposed application of the Velez reasoning, and with the extension
of the drug war approach in general, before suggesting why such
concerns should not prevent an effective utilization of schoolyard
statutes as a powerful weapon in the war on drugs.
II. The Need for a War on Drugs in the United States
While addictive narcotics are not a phenomena new to the
United States during the last twenty years,' the overall effects of
drug usage on the culture and society of the United States have
become increasingly apparent only since the late 1970s.2' Illicit
drug usage and addiction costs the United States hundreds of
billions of dollars a year,22 costs not inclusive of the billions spent
in purchasing the illegal drugs themselves' nor the taxes lost on
the profits of the illegal trade.24
Moreover, researchers conducting studies during the latter part
of the 1970s and early 1980s increasingly began to label drug use
20. Marthea Falco, Toward a Rational Drug Policy: Toward a More Effective Drug
Policy, 1994 U. CHr. LEGAL F. 9 (1994). "Since the early decades of the century, Americans
have viewed drug abuse as a foreign problem for which other countries are to blame." Id.
21. PRIDE, supra note 2. The "[d]rug epidemic" reached a peak in 1978-1979. Id.
More particularly, marijuana use reached an all-time high among adolescents during the
period from 1979 to 1981. Marijuana Use Up Sharply Among U.S. Youth, Reuters, Ltd.,
Sept. 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File; Penny Bender, Drug Czar
Says Juveniles Finding Plentiful Supply, Gannett News Service, Feb. 10, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
22. Rangel, supra note 6, at 44-46.
23. Id.
24. Ehrenfeld, supra note 15.
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and addiction as a major cause of other criminal activity.' "Most
Americans never have seen firsthand the powerful and depraved
activity in the world of illicit drugs."'  Beyond the psychological
impact of drug usage and addiction, the cost of supporting a drug
habit serves to induce the addict to make increasing use of illegal
means to support that addiction.27
Drugs also effect the health and welfare of all Americans, even
those not active in the drug culture.' There is a correlation
between the rapid increase in the number of HIV infected
Americans and the use of intravenous drugs.29 Common health
problems related to the use of illicit drugs include possible
overdosing, ° fetal addiction,3" and ultimately the death of the
user.3 2 Several of the most commonly used illicit drugs, including
marijuana, have been identified as being causal links to the increase
in teen pregnancies and also with a gradual impairment of short-
term memory, judgment and motor skills.33 But perhaps most
tragically, drug usage by a parent often can be identified as a
primary cause of neglect or malnutrition of a child.'
In fact, researchers have suggested that the heaviest tolls often
are taken by the nation's youth,35 but this burden is not limited to
the innocent children of adult users.36 For years America's youth
25. Claude Lewis, Draconian Measures are Necessary in the War on Drugs, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 2, 1995, at J7.
26. ld
27. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Toward a Rational Drug Policy: Solving the Drug
Enforcement Dilemma: Lessons from Economics, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1994).
28. Rangel, supra note 6, at 46-51.
29. Melody M. Heaps & Dr. James A. Swartz, Toward a Rational Drug Policy: Setting
New Priorities, 1994 U. CHL LEGAL F. 175 (1994); Rangel, supra note 6, at 50.
30. Falco, supra note 20, at 9.
31. Id. Rangel, supra note 6, at 47.
32. Lewis, supra note 25.
33. Gordon, supra note 15.
34. Ira E. Stoll, Drug Problems Getting Worse in Ventura County, Official Says; Abuse:
No Element of Society Seems Immune. One Report Shows a 73% Increase in Charges Against
Adults Countywide from 1992 to 1994, L.A. TiMEs, Aug. 27, 1995, at B18.
35. Louise M. Knott, Survey: Teens Say Drugs Their Biggest Problem, Gannet News
Serv., July 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File. "What's at stake in
the war on drugs is America's children, and our children are crying out for help." Id "I
have talked with addicts for years and have witnessed the deaths of countless young men and
women who were unable to end their enslavement. I have seen young people with old faces,
the result of persistent experimenting with drugs." Lewis, supra note 25.
36. Dole, supra note 15. "Today, our children are smoking more dope, smoking and




have tried to tell parents, teachers, and officials that their biggest
problem while growing up is the ready availability of illicit drugs.37
Marijuana use by teenagers reached a peak during the period from
1978 through 1982.38 But teenage drug use is not limited to
experimentation with marijuana.39 In fact, sources suggest that the
users of marijuana are far more likely to .progress into the use of
more dangerous hard drugs like cocaine and heroin.'
Despite the early signs of danger, the initial tolerance of drug
use by the American public during the 1960s and 1970s forced the
battle over drug use into the background.4 During the early
1980s, however, an emerging realization of the seriousness of the
drug epidemic prompted a change in the public opinion.42 In a
radio address to the nation, President Reagan set forth the need for
an all-out attack on the nation's drug problem.43 Curbing drug
abuse and the enforcement of drug laws regained prominence as
national priorities.'
In the following decade, the United States toughened its
approaches to drug use and abuse. 5 During the 1980s, federal
expenditures in the war on drugs totaled in excess of $20 billion.'
In addition, "state and local drug arrests grew 59 percent from 1981
to 1986 and climbed an additional 23 percent from 1986 to
1991.", 7  The resulting decline in drug usage, especially among
teens,' led to a general belief in the overall effectiveness of the
drug war.49
37. Gordon, supra note 15; Knott, supra note 35. Consider the response of students at
various elementary and high schools when asked if they could imagine a society without
drugs or violence. "Ninety-nine percent said, 'No."' Jean Bryant, Drug-Abuse Warrior
Accentuates the Positive, PriTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Sept. 7, 1995, at E5.
38. Teen-agers, supra note 15.
39. Dole, supra note 15.
40. Gordon, supra note 15. Moreover, studies suggest that the majority of the serious
drug users and addicts began to use drugs before their sixteenth birthday. See Hedrick, supra
note 1.
41. Krasnow, supra note 4, at 222.
42. 1I
43. See supra note 4.
44. Krasnow, supra note 4, at 222-23.
45. Id.
46. Bandow, supra note 13, at 243.
47. Schulhofer, supra note 27.
48. Teen-agers, supra note 15.
49. See Hedrick, supra note 1.
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But the successes of the initial years, whether or not illuso-
ry" have begun to disappear.1  With the beginning of the 1990s,
"the publicity surrounding the so-called war on drugs faded.
5 2
Surveys made during the last several years suggest that drug use is
once again on the rise, 3 with the most drastic increases among
America's youth.54 While crime has reportedly been on a steady
decrease overall, 55 drug-induced, violent crime is increasing at an
alarming rate. 6 More shocking are some reports which suggest a
tenfold increases in the number of criminal drug charges filed
against juveniles during the 1990s.51
Many researchers and commentators have begun to call for a
new offensive in the battle against drug use and addiction."
"With hard-core drugs cheap, plentiful and pure, narcotics abuse is
growing in America.,5 9 However, "America's capacity and stature
as a leader in the war on drugs has been seriously diminished. '
Without positive changes and a focusing of attention on the
problem at this time, the spiral of teen drug use and addiction is
likely to continue.
III. The Decision of Velez v. State
6'
In response to the increasing problem of teenage drug use, at
least one court has stepped up the offensive in the war against
50. Some statistics suggest that the war was being lost all along as evidenced by the
increase in drug related crimes and the doubling of steady cocaine users. Rangel, supra note
6, at 43.
51. See, e.g., Ehrenfeld, supra note 15.
52. Stoll, supra note 34.
53. See, e.g., Ehrenfeld, supra note 15. While estimates vary according to location and
sampling size, conservative estimates based on numerous federal reports suggest a doubling
of marijuana use and a 44.6% increase in the overall use of illegal drugs by high school
seniors. Id.
54. Stoll, supra note 34. "[Drug use] by high school and middle school kids is up, and
up big time." PRIDE, supra note 2.
55. Ehrenfeld, supra note 15.
56. IiL "Over 70% of the prison population, which is at a new high at 1.4 million, tested
positive for drugs after their arrest." Id.
57. Stoll, supra note 34.
58. Bender, supra note 21. "[N]either Congress nor the Clinton administration is doing
enough to stop the epidemic." Id "Attacking this bleak state of affairs should be at the top
of the White House agenda. But it is not." Ehrenfeld, supra note 15.
59. Bender, supra note 21.
60. Ehrenfeld, supra note 15.
61. 664 A.2d at 387 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
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drugs.62 In utilizing a tool already created by the legislature, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals upheld a conviction under the
Maryland schoolyard statute' when the defendant at no time did
or intended to possess or distribute drugs within the proscribed
school zone.' Instead, the defendant merely committed an act,
while on school grounds, that was in furtherance of a general
conspiracy to deliver drugs at a location outside of the school zone
created by the statute.65 A brief review of the case should serve
to introduce the reasoning behind this court's decision to extend
the application of the state schoolyard statute beyond a literal
application.
At trial, the defendant, Isabel Velez, was convicted of multiple
narcotics offenses including one count of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine within 1,000 yards of a school.' According to the review-
ing court, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the
appellant had committed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy while
on school property because Velez had made two drug related calls
from a pay phone located on school grounds.67 However, the
court also concluded that the evidence admitted at trial was
insufficient to show that the appellant had any intention of actually
distributing or possessing drugs within the school zone.'
Velez argued on appeal that the Maryland schoolyard statute
only covered conspiracies to commit the offense of actual posses-
sion or distribution within the school zone.69 Under this interpre-
tation of the statute, the mere commission of an act within the zone
which is in furtherance of a conspiracy would not be enough to
support a conviction under section 286D.7' According to Velez's
interpretation of the statute, to be convicted the prosecution must
show that the object of the conspiracy (either the possession or
delivery of narcotics) was achieved within the school zone or, in the
alternative, that the defendant had the intention to achieve the
object of the conspiracy within the school zone.7'
62. Id.
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D (1992).
64. Velez, 664 A.2d at 395.
65. Id. at 393.
66. Id. at 389. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D.
67. Velez, 664 A.2d at 395.
68. Id
69. Id. at 393.
70. Id.
71. Velez, 664 A.2d at 393.
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The Maryland Court of Special Appeals disagreed.7 2  The
court's analysis revolved around an interpretation of the legisla-
ture's intent in the passage of the schoolyard provision. 73 Accord-
ing to court, the intention of the legislation in the passage of
section 286D of the Maryland Code was to "eliminate all drug
related influences from school property, including conspiracies to
sell drugs.,74 Given that overarching intent, any contrary decision
would allow dealers to avoid prosecution under the schoolyard
provision by merely completing their transactions beyond the
statutory range.7  As a result of this feared evasion, the court
held that the conduct of the appellant while within a school zone,
which was in the furtherance of a general conspiracy to possess or
distribute narcotics, fell within the reach of the state schoolyard
statute.76
IV. Alternatives to Stepping up the Offensive in the War on
Drugs
The decision in Velez is not the only possible approach that
could be taken to combat the growing drug problem. At least two
alternatives to the escalation of drug war policies have been
proposed to fight the growing drug problem in the United States.
77
While a detailed examination of each alternative is beyond the
scope of this comment, a basic understanding of the alternatives
and the problems they pose will help to clarify the need for other
jurisdictions to undertake a course of action similar to that
undertaken by the Velez court.
One alternative to an increased application of criminal
sanctions is to legalize and regulate the sale and usage of currently
72. Id. at 395.
73. Id. at 394-95.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Velez, 664 A.2d at 395. Generally, the productive use of common schoolyard
provisions as a tool in the prosecution of drug offenders has been negligible. See Montoya,
supra note 12; Tougher Sentences Sought Against Dealers at Schools, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD Co., Jan. 26, 1994, at 42 [hereinafter Tougher Sentences]. This prior history of
difficulty in the enforcement of schoolyard statutes, may suggest that evasion of law may
continue to weaken the effect of schoolyard statutes absent the extension of the law to cover
every aspect of the drug problem near our nation's schools.
76. Velez, 664 A.2d at 395.
77. See generally Bandow, supra note 13 (advocating the legalization and regulation of
narcotics as a possible solution to the problems of illicit drug use); Falco, supra note 20
(suggesting that the true focus should be on demand side reduction rather than the typical
supply side reductions sought by enforcement of drug laws).
19971
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illegal substances.7" According to some theorists, the war on drugs
has failed.79 Because of this belief, proponents of legalization
argue that continuing the war on drugs only serves to increase the
dangers to userss° and artificially increase prices, helping to induce
the criminal element of drug addiction.8' To curb the abuses and
harms resulting from drug related crime and addiction, proponents
of drug legalization argue that the United States should legalize
drugs in order to control the production, sale and use of narcot-
* S82ics. s
However, opponents of the legalization movement claim that
there is no proof to show that the legalization of drugs will reduce
drug related crime.8 3 Moreover, these opponents suggest that the
legalization of drugs will only serve to lower prices, increase access,
and further harm the health and welfare of society.' While this
debate over the relative effectiveness of legalization continues, the
legalization of narcotics cannot be seen as the sole solution of the
modern drug problem.85
A second alternative to an increased application of criminal
sanctions is to focus the nation's attention and resources entirely on
demand side reduction.86 Demand side reduction is based largely
upon the desire to educate the masses in order to reduce the
demand, by users, for the narcotics.' The belief is that the better
educated the populous, the less likely that the abuse of narcotics
will present a problem.88 In order to implement the plans of
demand side reduction, proponents believe that the United States
78. See generally Bandow, supra note 13.
79. Id. at 242, 244-45.
80. Id. at 242, 244-47.
81. Id. at 246.
82. Bandow, supra note 13. Proponents of legalization often point to the examples of
Britain and the Netherlands as examples of the successes of legalization. Id. at 254.
83. See, e.g., Gregory A. Loken, The Importance of Being Earnest: Why the Case for
Drug Legalization Remains Unproven, 27 CONN. L. REV. 659, 666-669 (1995); Schulhofer,
supra note 27.
84. Schulhofer, supra note 27. The idea is that addicts would become additionally
reliant on narcotics with a resulting increase in the drive and need for a fix. Id.
85. See generally id. The underlying basis of the objections to legalization can be
summarized by the belief that "legalization is itself costly and very risky." Id.
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must reallocate its resources to better educate its citizens and to
advocate a change in attitudes and in behavior.89
However, as with legalization, demand side reduction theory
is not without its critics.9 "Drug education is good, but it won't
provide a total solution. Education must be a part of the solution
along with other firm approaches."9' Even among serious propo-
nents of change in the United States' approach to solving the
nation's drug problems, the role of demand side reduction is not to
be considered exclusive, but must be combined with an effective
level of criminal enforcement. 92 Without the joint, effective
application of both demand side reduction (education) and supply
side reduction (enforcement), no lasting advances can be expected
to be made.93
The decision in Velez appears to offer increased prosecution
and enhanced sentencing of drug offenders who attempt to deal
with school children.94 Since some law enforcement agencies have
admitted to few prosecutions under current schoolyard statutes,
95
this could be exactly what the schoolyard statutes require to
become more effective tools in the battle against drugs.96 There-
fore, in order to make schoolyard statutes more effective in the war
against drugs, other jurisdictions should consider the adoption of
the Velez reasoning and allow for the prosecution of acts in
furtherance of conspiracies when the acts are committed within the
proscribed school zone.
V. Classification and Characteristics of Standard Schoolyard
Statutes
Before advocating that the approach in Velez should be
uniformly adopted, it is important to identify the different types of
89. 1l
90. See Gordon, supra note 15. Less than 10% of students in a recent poll felt that
school drug prevention programs had any effect. Id. See also Rangel, supra note 6, at 52-56.
91. Lewis, supra note 25.
92. Rangel, supra note 6.
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. The application of existing drug laws
to scenarios not specifically dealt with by the statutes could allow the laws to be as effective
in the fight against crime as originally intended by the legislature. See Velez v. State, 664
A.2d 387, 393-95 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
95. Tougher Sentences, supra note 75. "[P]olice and prosecutors have complained that
there have been almost no cases prosecuted under that [schoolyard] law because it's almost
impossible to catch someone actually selling drugs." Id. See also, Montoya, supra note 12.
96. See supra note 94.
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schoolyard statutes currently in use in the various jurisdictions.
Schoolyard statutes are as distinct as any other type of legisla-
tion.97 Each jurisdiction needs, therefore, to consider first whether
or not the statute currently enacted by its own legislature can be
interpreted to include prosecutions for conspiracy.
Schoolyard statutes can vary in many different ways. For
instance, some schoolyard statutes create a separate offense for
which the offender may be prosecuted,9" while others merely allow
for enhanced sentencing upon the conviction of the defendant
under standard narcotics law.99 However, for the general purpose
of analyzing the practical application of the Velez approach,
schoolyard statutes can be characterized as belonging to one of two
distinct types depending on whether or not the statute explicitly
allows for the prosecution of conspiracies. 1°
In a Type I statute,' the legislature has purposefully includ-
ed an explicit provision dealing with the commission of a conspira-
cy within the specified statutory zone."° Typically, the question
97. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (199?) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (1995) with MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D (1995). Even a cursory reading of two different statutes is
sufficient to illustrate the differences which exist within two seemingly similar jurisdictions.
98. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D.
99. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 860(a).
100. As a matter of convenience, for the remainder of this comment the two categories
will be identified as either Type I Statutes (which contain explicit references to the
application of the provision to conspiracies) or Type II Statutes (which are silent on the
possibility of the provision's application to conspiracies).
101. Examples of Type I statutes include those currently enacted in Tennessee, New
Hampshire, and Maryland. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-432 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 318-B:26 (1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D (1995).
102. Since much of the remainder will focus in part on the interpretation and analysis of
the identified statutes, the text to be considered is excerpted in the next several footnotes.
The pertinent portions of two of the Type I statutes identified in note 101 are excerpted
below.
The Maryland statute provides in part:
§ 286D Manufacture, distribution, etc., of controlled dangerous substances near
schools or on school vehicles.
(a) A person who manufactures, distributes, dispenses, or possesses with intent to
distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation of s 286 (a) (1) of this
subheading, or who conspires to commit any of these offenses, is guilty of a felony
if the offense occurred:
(1) In, on, or within 1,000 feet of any real property owned by or leased to
any elementary school, secondary school, or school board, and used for
elementary or secondary education...
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D.
The application of the Tennessee schoolyard statute requires the use of an additional
section of the Tennessee Code. This additional section is the general criminal prohibition
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of whether or not the perpetrator must intend to complete the
object of the conspiracy within the statutory zone is not explicitly
answered by the Type I schoolyard statute. 3 Application of the
Velez rule to these statutes involves an analysis similar to that
conducted by the court in Velez."°
In a Type II statute,0 5 the legislature has not explicitly
referenced any application of the schoolyard provision in cases
involving drug conspiracies." 6 Instead, the legislature has inter-
against certain narcotics.
§ 39-17-417 Criminal offenses and penalties.
(a) It is an offense for a defendant to knowingly:
(1) Manufacture a controlled substance;
(2) Deliver a controlled substance;
(3) Sell a controlled substance; or
(4) Possess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell
such controlled substance.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417 (1995). The second provision is the following enhancement
provision for a violation of section 39-17-417 of the Tennessee Code:
§ 39-17-432 Drug-Free School Zone-Enhanced criminal penalties for violations
within zone.
(b) A violation of s 39-17-417, or a conspiracy to violate such section, that occurs
on the grounds or facilities of any school or within one thousand feet (1,000') of
the real property that comprises a public or private elementary school, middle
school or secondary school shall be punished one (1) classification higher than is
provided in s 39-17-417(b)-(i) for such violation.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-432.
103. The statutes in note 102 are unclear as to their application when the object of the
conspiracy is not to be completed within the school zone. See supra note 102. At least one
jurisdiction has, however, adopted a schoolyard provision which appears to remove any such
ambiguity. According to section 318-B:26 of the New Hampshire Code:
§ 318-B:26. Penalties
IV. Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this
chapter is punishable by imprisonment or a fine or both, which may not exceed
the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was
the object of the attempt or conspiracy.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:26 (1995).
104. See infra Part VI.A.
105. Examples of Type II statutes include those currently enacted by the federal
legislature and in the state of New Jersey. See 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:35-7 (1995).
106. The pertinent portions of the two Type II statutes identified in note 105 are
excerpted below.
The federal statute provides:
§ 860. Distribution or manufacturing in or near schools and colleges
(a) Penalty
Any person who violates section 841(a)(1) ... of this title by distributing,
possessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance in or
on, or within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private
elementary, vocational, or secondary school .. ., is .. . subject to (1) twice the
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nally cross-referenced the state's schoolyard statute to connect it
with the jurisdiction's standard possession and distribution statutes,
which are often also silent as to their general application to
conspiracies." There is, then, some ambiguity as to whether the
Type II statutes should be applied to cover a conspiracy where the
legislature has failed to internally cross reference the schoolyard
statute to the applicable conspiracy statute of the jurisdiction." s
maximum punishment authorized by section 841(b) of this title ....
21 U.S.C. § 860(a).
The New Jersey statute similarly provides:
2C:35-7. Distributing, dispensing or possessing controlled dangerous substance or
controlled substance analog on or within 1,000 feet of school property or bus...
Any person who violates subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:35-5 by distributing, dispensing
or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or
controlled substance analog while on any school property used for school purposes
which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school
board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property ... , is guilty of a crime of the
third degree....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7.
107. The statutory provisions referred to in title 21, § 860(a) of the United States Code
are excerpted as follows:
§ 841. Prohibited acts A
(a) Unlawful acts
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance ..
21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994), and
§ 856. Establishment of manufacturing operations
(a) Except as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful to-
(1) knowingly open or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing,
distributing, or using any controlled substance;
(2) manage or control any building, room, or enclosure,..., for the purpose
of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.
21 U.S.C. § 856 (1994).
The New Jersey statute referred to in section 2C:35-7 is excerpted in part:
2C:35-5. Manufacturing, distributing or dispensing
a. Except as authorized by P.L.1970, c. 226 (C. 24:21-1 et seq.), it shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly or purposely:
(1) To manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess or have under his
control with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous
substance or controlled substance analog...
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-5 (1995).
108. For instance, the federal conspiracy statute which applies to drug cases provides:
§ 846. Attempt and conspiracy
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this
subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the
offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.
21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994).
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Analysis of the possible application of the Velez rule in cases
involving Type II schoolyard statutes involves, therefore, an level
of analysis above and beyond that required to support an applica-
tion in cases involving Type I statutes.
VI. Extension of the Velez Rule to Typical Type I and Type II
Jurisdictions
As mentioned previously, the application of the decision in
Velez would seem to help effectuate and promote the agenda of the
war on drugs.' The following subsections consider the viability
of extending the application of Velez to some typical Type I"°
and Type II" jurisdictions.
A. Application of Velez in Type I Jurisdictions
Jurisdictions such as Maryland and Tennessee which employ
Type I schoolyard statutes explicitly reference the possible
prosecution for conspiracy under these provisions. 2 However,
since the statutes are silent as to what conspiracies are covered
under the schoolyard statute,"3 a major concern in advocating an
extension of these statutes to situations similar to that in Velez is
the problem of determining the conspiracies to which the statutes
should apply."4 Should the statutes be read narrowly so as to
allow only for the prosecution of conspiracies which intend as their
object either possession or distribution within the proscribed
Likewise, under the New Jersey conspiracy statute:
2C:5-2. Conspiracy
a. Definition of conspiracy. A person is guilty of conspiracy with another
person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating its commission he:
(1) Agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of
them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or
solicitation to commit such crime; or
(2) Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or
commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2 (1995).
109. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 101.
111. See supra note 105.
112. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
114. See generally Velez v. State, 664 A.2d 387, 393-395 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995). This
concern was what the court in Velez was trying resolve. Id.
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zone,115 or should the statutes be utilized to prosecute any act of
conspiracy to possess or distribute drugs when any act in further-
ance of the conspiracy occurs with the school zone?" 6
Whenever two equally appropriate and rationally supportable
interpretations of a statute exist, and the intentions of the legisla-
ture are not readily apparent on the face of the statute, then the
statute may be considered ambiguous."7 The inverse of this
statement is often expressed by courts when they are considering
the proper interpretation and application of a statute."' "If the
language of the statute is plain and clear and expresses a meaning
consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, further analysis is
not ordinarily required.""' 9
The typical Type I statutes"2° are not without some ambiguity
on the question of which conspiracies are properly within the ambit
of the statute.12' Consider the following language in section 39-
17-432 of the Tennessee Code: "A violation of § 39-17-417, or a
conspiracy to violate such section . . . ."' While this statement
explicitly evidences the legislature's intent to apply the provision to
some conspiracies in general, the language of the statute does not
eliminate the question of whether the conspiracies covered must
have as their object the actual possession or distribution of
narcotics within the zone created by the statute.' 23
Where a statute has been adjudged to be ambiguous as to a
material matter, a court is forced to attempt to select the "best"
possible interpretation.24 Some courts have concluded that, when
the statute is unclear on its face and absent some clear expression
115. Id This was in fact the argument of the appellant in Velez. See also supra notes
69-71 and accompanying text.
116. Velez, 664 A.2d at 394. This was the position of the state in Velez. See also supra
notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
117. United States v. Roberts, 735 F. Supp 537, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
118. Velez, 664 A.2d at 394.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 102. This is to distinguish the common Type I statute from a less
common but less ambiguous example found in jurisdictions such as New Hampshire. See
supra note 103.
121. Supra note 103 and accompanying text.
122. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-432.
123. Supra note 103 and accompanying text. Neither possible construction is foreclosed
given the language of the statute.
124. Velez v. State, 664 A.2d 387, 394 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
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of the intention of the legislature, the rule of lenity"~ should be
applied to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant,
especially in criminal cases."2 However, the rule of lenity should
only come into play where the ambiguity cannot be resolved by an
examination of the legislative intent of the statute'
27
In the case of the typical Type I schoolyard statute, the
legislative intent in the passage of the particular provision can
provide an insight into the proper interpretation of the statute. At
one extreme, the Tennessee statute actively incorporates the
legislative intent into the actual provision."2  The Tennessee
legislature's intention was to protect children from all aspects of
drug activities when they were within the specified school zone. 29
The use of the words "drug activity" as opposed to the more
restrained "drug trade" suggests that the legislature did not intend
to limit the application of the statute to situations in which
possession or distribution actually took place within the ambit of
the school zone."3 Instead, we may presume from this word
choice that the legislature intended for the statute to protect
children from all direct and indirect effects and consequences of
drug activities which occur on school grounds, including the
125. United States v. Rodriguez, 961 F.2d 1089, 1093 (3rd Cir. 1992). The rule of lenity
dictates that in the absence of clear legislative intent there should be "an overriding
consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers." Id.
126. United States v. Roberts, 735 F. Supp 537, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
127. Rodriguez, 961 F.2d at 1094. This case seems to hold that the statute is not to be
considered ambiguous at all if the intent of the legislature or history of the legislation can
provide a clear understanding. Id. It seems more logical, however, to conclude that the
statute is ambiguous but then require an examination of legislative intent and history before
blindly interpreting the statute in favor of the defendant.
128. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-432. The Tennessee schoolyard statute contains a
description of the intent of the legislature in the first subsection of the statute. It reads as
follows:
39-17-432 Drug-Free School Zone-Enhanced criminal penalties for violations
within zone.
(a) It is the intent of this section to create Drug-Free School Zones for the
purpose of providing all students in this state an environment in which they can
learn without the distractions and dangers that are incident to the occurrence of
drug activity in or around school facilities. The enhanced and mandatory minimum
sentences required by this section for drug offenses occurring in a Drug-Free






arrangements for the sale of drugs at another location or from
merely being in the vicinity of any drug dealers. 31
Even in states such as Maryland which do not incorporate the
intent of the legislature into the statute,132 the legislature's intent
in the formation and enactment of the statute can be readily ascer-
tained. Early decisions in which courts were forced to interpret
schoolyard statutes are replete with testimonies as to the intended
purposes of schoolyard provisions.133  In addition, the intent and
purpose of the legislatures in the enactment of these provisions can
be inferred from the derivation and alteration of the language
chosen by the enacting legislature as compared to the language of
the general Type II statutes from which these provision were often
patterned134
Since the legislatures have supposedly adopted a schoolyard
provision in an attempt to abolish all effects of the drug trade and
drug usage near schools, 135 to disallow the application of the
schoolyard statute to acts, undertaken on or near school grounds,
which are in furtherance of drug conspiracies, would undermine the
very purpose of the statute. A decision not to apply a schoolyard
statute in this scenario creates a loophole in an important area of
narcotics enforcement sought to protect school-aged children from
exposure to the drug culture.
36
Given the importance placed upon the protection of school-
aged children from a steady exposure to illicit drugs and the
associated drug culture, the courts in jurisdictions which currently
utilize a schoolyard statute similar to the statutes of Tennessee and
Maryland would be advised to extend their application of the
jurisdiction's schoolyard statute. Such an extension would allow for
131. Cf. Velez v. State, 664 A.2d 387, 395 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (identifying the
general intent of the similar Maryland statute).
132. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D. The provision is silent about the legislature's
intentions in passage of the schoolyard provision.
133. Dawson v. State, 619 A.2d 111, 116 (Md. 1993). See also United States v. Holland,
810 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the overarching interest of protecting children
from all aspects of the drug culture places a heavy burden on the drug traffickers against
whom the law was expected to be applied).
134. Velez, 664 A.2d at 394. According to the court in Velez, the Maryland statute was
closely patterned after the federal and New Jersey statutes. The court concluded that the
Maryland legislature's purposeful alteration of the typical Type II statute to expressly include
a conspiracy provision is sufficient evidence of an intent to make the application of the
Maryland statute much broader than the standard Type II statute. Id
135. Supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
136. Velez, 664 A.2d at 395.
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the prosecution of drug conspirators who commit any act in
furtherance of their conspiracy while within the protected school
zone. To do otherwise would do disservice to the intent and
purpose behind the passage of the schoolyard statute and result in
the loss of a powerful tool in the war on drugs.
B. Application of Velez to Typical Type II Jurisdictions
The application of the Velez approach proves more difficult in
jurisdictions which have enacted Type II schoolyard statutes.'37
In these jurisdictions, the legislatures have failed to explicitly
connect the prosecution of conspiracies with the jurisdiction's
schoolyard statute.13 Instead, these jurisdictions tend to cross
reference the schoolyard statute to some substantive narcotics
offense.139 This offense often is identified as possessing, manufac-
turing, or distributing a controlled substance within the proscribed
area.140 In addition, these jurisdictions generally employ a
separate conspiracy statute which is often either cross-referenced
to the same substantive offense as the schoolyard statute or held to
apply to any offense committed which is in violation of the
applicable section of the state code.
141
In order to apply the Velez decision in jurisdictions using Type
II statutes, there must be some connection between the jurisdic-
tion's conspiracy statute and the corresponding schoolyard
provision. Such a connection often can be identified only after
making a careful examination of the underlying application and
purposes of the conspiracy statute.
The conspiracy statutes of the chosen jurisdictions 42 make it
a crime to agree to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
under the enacted code. 43 Moreover, the federal conspiracy
statute explicitly connects the penalties for the conspiracy to
commit a crime with the same penalty for the substantive of-
fense.'" While the statutes do not explicitly equate the commis-
137. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (1995).
138. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). In fact, application to conspiracy seems to be explicitly
foreclosed by the legislature's failure to cross-reference the statutes to the jurisdiction's
conspiracy statute. Id&
139. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7.
140. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7.
141. 21 U.S.C. § 846; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2.
142. 21 U.S.C. § 846; NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2C:5-2.
143. 21 U.S.C. § 846; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2.
144. 21 U.S.C. § 846.
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sion of the conspiracy with the underlying substantive offense, it
may be inferred that the inclusion of the conspiracy provisions
within the drug law legislation evidences the intent of the legisla-
ture that the acts of conspiring to commit a specific drug offense be
considered as blameworthy and reprehensible as the actual
commission of the substantive offense so as to require punishment
similar to the actual commission of the offense.145
Flowing from that connection comes the realization that a
decision to disallow the application of the schoolyard provisions in
cases involving an conspiracy to actually distribute or possess a
controlled substance within the specified zone would result in
differential treatment between similar offenders. This difference in
the treatment of two offenders, based solely on the limited
application of the schoolyard statute, is difficult to justify given the
intention of the federal legislature to avoid such differential
treatment under the federal drug laws."4 Therefore, where the
underlying offense is the possession, manufacturing, or distribution
of a controlled substance within a school zone, it would be
disruptive of the stated purposes of the drug laws to apply the
schoolyard statutes to the commission of an actual offense but not
to a conspiracy to commit the same offense. 4 7
Given this connection between the conspiracy statutes and
schoolyard statutes in Type II jurisdictions when the object of the
conspiracy is to be completed within the statutory zone, the
remainder of the analysis for Type II jurisdictions becomes very
similar to that utilized in the analysis of Type I jurisdictions.1"
The intention of the legislature in the passage of the drug law
provisions was to provide "severe criminal penalties for persons
engaged in illicit manufacture or sale of controlled drugs primarily
for the profits to be derived therefrom."'49  To allow the very
producers and "merchants" that the law had intended to punish
145. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91ST Cong., 2ND Sess. 1970, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4566, 4570.
146. § 846. The text of the statute is clear, the penalty for commission of a conspiracy
should be equal to the penalty for the underlying offense which was the object of the
conspiracy. Id.
147. Again, any contrary interpretation would create a significant loophole for narcotics
offenders who are cognizant of this difference in treatment. See supra note 136 and
accompanying text.
148. See supra Part VI.A.
149. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91ST Cong., 2ND Sess. 1970, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4566, 4570.
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most severely to escape the enhanced punishments by arranging the
sale of narcotics within a school zone but relocating for the final
"delivery" of the product is detrimental to the effective administra-
tion of justice under the drug law.t" Courts in jurisdictions which
employ Type II schoolyard statutes should examine this tenuous
connection between the relevant conspiracy, possession, and
schoolyard statutes. Where a connection, similar to that identified
above, can be made between the three, the reviewing court should
seriously consider extending the application of the schoolyard
provision in order to better effectuate the goals of the drug war
legislation.
VII. General Concerns with a Uniform Application of the Velez
Approach 1'
The above analysis suggests that the intentions of the legisla-
ture in the passage of criminal drug laws can be best effectuated
through the application of schoolyard statutes to the commission of
acts, performed within a school zone, which are done in furtherance
of any drug conspiracy. However, there are some concerns with
the application of the Velez rationale which should be considered
before blindly supporting such an agenda. These concerns include
both potential problems with the constitutionality of such provi-
sions152 and, also, the resulting prison overcrowding caused by the
influx of drug offenders into the penitentiary systems.
1 53
Some commentators have questioned the constitutionality of
mandatory or enhanced sentencing of drug offenders as a means of
fighting a national war on drugs.1" According to these opponents
of the current drug law policies, the application of severe penalties
in cases involving drug transactions should be considered a
violation of the constitutional protection from cruel and unusual
150. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
151. Since this comment suggests that other jurisdictions should extend the application
of their schoolyard statutes to cover acts of conspiracies similar to those dealt with in Velez,
these basic concerns with a hard line drug war approach are relevant to the general analysis.
An in depth analysis of these concerns, however, must be left to other sources since that
analysis is beyond the scope of this comment.
152. See generally Scott K. Peterson, Comment, The Punishment Need Not Fit the Crime:
Harmelin v. Michigan and the Eighth Amendment, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 747 (1993).
153. See Jim Efstanthiou, The Big Squeeze: Hard Line Drug Laws are Clogging our
Prisons, THE RECORD, March 26, 1995, at A31. See also Small-timers, supra note 14.
154. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 152.
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punishments.'55 According to this analysis, the prosecution and
eventual incarceration of drug offenders with sentences that are as
long or longer than some violent offenders156 is disproportionate
to the crime committed. 157
.This concern already has been addressed, however, by the
Supreme Court in Harmelin v. Michigan.158 In Harmelin, the
court concluded that a mandatory sentence may, at times, be cruel,
but it need not be unusual.159 In concluding that the imposition
of a life sentence following a conviction for possession of narcotics
was not violative of the Eighth Amendment, the majority based its
decision in part on the apparent importance of the war on drugs to
the Michigan legislature. 16
The decision of Harmelin is consistent with the Supreme
Court's ready acceptance of state and federal drug laws.16' Given
the Supreme Court's willingness to accept the decisions of the
legislatures as to the proper punishment of crimes,'" there is little
chance that the Court would find the application of Velez type
reasoning in drug conspiracy cases to be a violation of the federal
Constitution."
Another concern often identified whenever increased criminal
penalties are advocated is the continuing problem of prison
overcrowding."6 There is little doubt that the war on drugs has
served to aid in the drastic increase in the United States prison
population.65 Opponents of a hard-line approach to drug en-
forcement argue that the expense of incarcerating the general
155. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Peterson, supra note 152.
156. Efstanthiou, supra note 153. The average stay for a first time federal drug offender
is 74 months. The average stay for sexual abuse, assault, manslaughter, burglary, and arson
are all substantially lower. Id.
157. Peterson, supra note 152.
158. 501 U.S. at 957.
159. Id at 994-95.
160. Id at 988-90.
161. Krasnow, supra note 4 at 266. The Supreme Court has been heralded as protecting
the balance between the need to stop the "scourge of drugs" with the necessary protection
of constitutional right. Id.
162. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991)(Kennedy, J., concurring opinion).
163. For a more complete analysis of this concern consider the two articles cited
previously. Compare Peterson, supra note 152 with Krasnow, supra note 4.
164. Efstanthiou, supra note 153.
165. I See also Small-timers, supra note 14.
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offender is prohibitive' 66 and that incarceration is ineffective as
a deterrent to drug activities. 67
However, supporters of hard-line drug enforcement suggest
that the imposition of tough drug sentences is exactly what is
needed to win the drug war.'68 Since drug use is an often identi-
fied component in other criminal behavior,"6 the overall effect of
more active drug law enforcement on the general level of prison
populations may not be so high. 7° In addition, with the use of
the doctrine of merger17 1 the punishment of conspiracies under
schoolyard statutes may result in higher sentences, but not in
excessively higher sentences since the commission of other crimes
may be incorporated (merged) with the schoolyard offense. 72
Overall, the identified concerns are not sufficiently pressing so
as to discourage an extensive application of schoolyard statutes to
conspiracy cases. Given the relative freedom of application of
federal and state schoolyard statutes to other factual scenarios,"
it seems reasonable that the courts will have no qualms with
166. Efstanthiou, supra note 153. Incarceration of federal drug offenders alone could cost
taxpayers in excess of $58 million a year. Id. "[J]ust to incarcerate drug inmates already
serving mandatory sentences in Massachusetts will cost taxpayers here about $250 million."
Small-timers, supra note 14.
167. Efstanthiou, supra note 153.
168. John P. Walters, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 107 (1994).
"An important means of persuading individuals not to use drugs is to make it clear to them
that using drugs will lead inevitably to specific adverse consequences and sanctions." Id.
169. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
170. Cf. Rangel, supra note 6, at 51-52. It has been suggested that the assumptions made
about the drug war's effect on the size of the nation's prison population is erroneous given
the relationship between drug use and other common crimes. Id.
171. State v. Thomas, 607 A.2d 997,998 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 1992) (providing an
example of the use of the doctrine of merger in a typical schoolyard case). The doctrine of
merger involves the concept of combining separate offenses into one greater offense which
covers all the lesser offenses. Id. The doctrine of merger, as applied in schoolyard cases,
is likely to result in the merger of the general conspiracy or possessory offense with the
harsher offense or sentence under the jurisdiction's schoolyard provision. Id. The result
flowing from this concept of merger is that the defendant is not being punished for
something new. The schoolyard statutes are doing only what could be achieved through
application of multiple offenses under the jurisdiction's criminal code, albeit the schoolyard
statute is doing a more complete job of it.
172. See generally Efstanthiou, supra note 153; Schulhofer, supra note 27; Small-timers,
supra note 14.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Wake, 948 F.2d 1422 (5th Cir. 1991) (possession within the
zone is sufficient even where the defendant intended to distribute the drugs elsewhere);
United States v. Rowe, 911 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying a schoolyard statute absent a
showing of sales to minors); See also State v. Ivory, 592 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1991).
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extending the application of the schoolyard statutes in conspiracy
cases similar to Velez. 174
VIII. Conclusion
The scourge of drug use and abuse is growing, and it is
continuing to destroy the lives of many of America's children.175
Something must be done, and done soon, to protect our children
from the horrors of the drug culture, a culture that is growing
stronger daily. Several possibilities have been identified in this
comment which might help to reduce the strain on American youth.
But only one makes use of the tools already in possession of state
and federal jurisdictions.176 In Velez v. State, one court has
chosen that particular approach to step up its enforcement of the
jurisdiction's drug laws."7
Extending the application of schoolyard statutes to situations
similar to the facts of Velez will not solve all of the nation's drug
problems by itself. But it is a step in the right direction. Some
current drug laws are rarely used because violators know how to
circumvent the spirit and intentions of the laws.178 Since, the
various legislatures had a legitimate interest and pursued that
legitimate purpose through the enactment of the schoolyard
statutes, 79 it is the role of the courts to make sure that the law
is applied in a manner sufficient to effectuate this identified intent.
Schoolyard provisions could be an important tool in removing
the drug problem from the nation's schools. Without a safe place
of education, many children can never be free of the pressures of
modern society. By prosecuting the conspirator who performs acts
174. See supra Parts III and VI.
175. See supra notes 35-57 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text. Legalization and demand side
reduction would require an entire reallocation of resources and a refocusing of attentions.
See supra Part IV.
177. 664 A.2d 387 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
178. The general intent in the passage of schoolyard statutes was to eliminate all aspects
of the drug culture near schools. See supra notes 128-133. But these laws rarely are used by
enforcement agencies. Montoya, supra note 12. This is largely because the dealers that had
been a primary target of the schoolyard statutes know enough not to consummate their
transactions within the school zone. Under current interpretation of schoolyard statutes,
unless the suspect actually possesses or distributes the drugs in the zone, the law is
inapplicable. See United States v. Rowe, 911 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1990).
179. Rowe, 911 F.2d at 52. "Congress wanted to lessen the risk that drugs would be
readily available to school children. It is surely rational to achieve that goal by increasing
penalties for those who sell drugs near schools." ld. (emphasis added).
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within school zones in furtherance of any drug conspiracy, the
courts can send a powerful message to drug offenders, namely stay
away from our schools.
The extension of schoolyard statutes suggested by the Velez
approach is the first step in restoring order using the weapons
already created to fight the battle against drug use. Only when the
nation gets tough on drug activities near schools can our children
be expected to see the dangers and the horrors of drug use and
abuse. "Our children are crying out for help."' ° The Maryland
courts have taken the first step and offered an example of how to
begin to quiet those cries for help. Other jurisdictions, like those
identified in this comment, must now decide whether or not to
follow that example in the hopes of quieting the fears of our
nation's children.
Wayne L. Mowery, Jr.
180. Gordon, supra note 15.
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